After CCP Spy Fiasco, US Should Reconsider Sharing Intel With Canada
Helen Raleigh Visit on Twitter@HRaleighspeaks
Until Canada demonstrates it can protect shared allied secrets, partners — especially the United States — should reasonably limit what they share.
In late July, a Canadian woman of Chinese descent was arrested in Belgium on serious charges of espionage for China while serving as an intern with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canadian media have identified the woman as Biwei Zhang, also known professionally as Claire Zhang or Catina Zhang.
Reportedly born in China, she later became a naturalized Canadian citizen. Zhang has a background in systems engineering, computer science, and economics. Before starting her internship at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, in July 2025, Zhang worked at the Canadian Space Agency and Statistics Canada.
SHAPE is described as the central operational command hub for the 32-member NATO alliance. Zhang worked in the IT department. According to The Brussels Times, Zhang’s suspicious behaviors, including “excessive curiosity about her colleagues, a tendency to enter areas to which she was not authorised, and claims that she had accessed files outside her professional remit,” prompted SHAPE security to flag her and refer the case to Belgian intelligence.
Belgian authorities searched Zhang’s home and workplace at SHAPE before placing her in pretrial detention, which was later extended by one month. NATO has stated nothing of importance was compromised. Zhang has made no public comments on the espionage allegations but has appealed the detention order. A decision on her appeal is expected in the coming days.
Zhang’s espionage case is not an isolated security lapse. It is a symptom of a deeper reality: Canada does have a China problem, due to a security culture that has repeatedly subordinated rigorous vetting and threat assessment to commercial and diplomatic engagement with Beijing.
It is concerning because Canada is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, a longstanding partnership that also includes Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The alliance shares some of the world’s most sensitive intelligence, particularly signals intelligence (SIGINT), as well as information on foreign interference, cyber threats, espionage, and military developments. China is one of the primary targets of this collective effort. As Canada deepens economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing, despite clear evidence of screening failures and a pattern of prioritizing commercial interests, allies are entitled to ask whether Ottawa can still be trusted with the most sensitive intelligence.
Since Zhang’s arrest, The Globe and Mail has revealed a troubling “history of fraud.” While applying for a position at the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in 2019, Zhang submitted two similar applications under different names and email addresses on the same day. This deceitful strategy allowed her to take the eligibility exam twice within 24 hours, apparently a blatant attempt to manipulate the hiring process. When “asked directly” about the double applications, Zhang refused to acknowledge what she had done. A 2023 investigation by the Public Service Commission confirmed the finding, which a federal court upheld in 2024. As a consequence, Zhang was mandated to complete an ethics course and inform the commission before accepting certain public service roles.