Why They Hate Us: The Sources of Terrorist Conduct
by Mike Watson
It’s not us, it’s them
The second plane was the most shocking on September 11. Not just because its collision with the World Trade Center was caught on film, but also because it ruled out any innocent explanation. This was not an accident. For the first time in decades, the homeland was under attack. Much about American life would have to change.
Conspiracy theories about 9/11 still swirl around the gutters of the internet, but there’s also an active debate about why these attacks occurred. Some people blame Israel because, in their view, the Muslim world would have no quarrel with the United States if it were not for the Jewish state. Others think the attack was a natural, and possibly even justified, response to U.S. imperialism and hubris. Neither claim is true. Al Qaeda attacked Washington and New York because the terrorists wanted to harm American interests in the Middle East and beyond. Our allies, however, are not a source of vulnerability, but of strength.
Al Qaeda came into being during a turbulent moment in the Middle East. Two broad schools of thought had emerged in the Middle East about how to regain a dominant role in world affairs. One camp argued that copying Western institutions would create Western levels of power. The other countered that imitating the early Islamic community would yield greater spiritual, moral, and ultimately political strength. Osama bin Laden created his terrorist group when these Salafists were on the ascent.
During the 20th century, many Middle Eastern countries adopted some Western institutions, such as elaborate constitutions that they routinely ignored. They more enthusiastically embraced some of the worst ideas emanating from the West, such as state-led economies and other dead-end Marxist concepts. By 1980, secular-leaning dictators ruled Arab civilizational centers like Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus. The Salafists had nothing to show in the Sunni world, although a Shia Islamic revolution had seized control of Iran.
A decade later, secularism seemed like a loser. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein attacked Iran, endured a bloody multiyear stalemate, then invaded Kuwait and watched his Soviet-equipped army get blown to smithereens by a U.S.-led coalition. The mujahideen, by contrast, had driven the Soviets out of Afghanistan, albeit with substantial American support. After channeling funds and other assistance from the Gulf to some fighters during the Afghan war, bin Laden partnered with Ayman al-Zawahiri, who aimed to overthrow the Egyptian government but mostly slaughtered civilians. Zawahiri believed attacking the “far enemy,” the United States, was necessary for overthrowing Arab governments.